Democratic Leadership Theatre Under Hostility In Volatile Political–Economic Environments: Strategic Leadership, Institutional Memory, And Reform Credibility In Nigeria
1. Aliu, Olusola Ph.D., 2. Sarumi, Oyewole Ph.D.
Volume 6, Issue 1, April 2026
This article examines Nigeria’s post-2023 reform package (“Tinubunomics”) as both a macroeconomic stabilisation agenda and a legitimacy project conducted under persistent political hostility and volatility. It introduces Democratic Leadership Theatre under Hostility (DLTH) as a strategic leadership mechanism through which democratic governments stage credibility, empathy, and control while implementing painful reforms. We apply a qualitative, document-based design that combines process tracing of reform sequencing with targeted discourse coding to identify leadership “theatre” repertoires (e.g., resolve signalling, blame allocation, empathy performance, and technocratic seriousness). DLTH is anchored in performative governance and “good enough governance” perspectives (Ding, 2020; Grindle, 2007) and integrated with political economy accounts of reform coalitions and compensation politics (McCulloch et al., 2021; Lavers & Hickey, 2021). The study synthesises 25 Scopus-indexed peer-reviewed articles and analyses 17 official/policy sources: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) reform communications and FX policy statements (CBN, 2023; 2023/2024), inflation statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2024; 2025), and diagnostics from the IMF, World Bank, and AfDB (IMF, 2024; World Bank, 2024; 2025; AfDB, 2025). ODI and tax-law analyses support the interpretation of subsidy sustainability and revenue reform (Nnamani, 2024; PwC Nigeria, 2025; PLAC, 2025). Reuters is used only for dated context markers. First, Tinubunomics operates as a credibility-focused reform bundle whose welfare impacts, amplified by exchange-rate pass-through, predictably intensify hostility (Adeniyi et al., 2022; NBS, 2024; 2025). Second, leaders deploy DLTH to stabilise legitimacy while pursuing subsidy and FX reforms. Third, the durability of reform is moderated by institutional memory: where routines and continuity are weak, theatre substitutes for institutions and reforms drift (Machava&Gonçalves, 2021; Grindle, 2011). Fourth, compensation credibility and timing shape the intensity and persistence of backlash (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; Hickey &Bukenya, 2021). Reform survival requires institutional memory infrastructure, rules-based compensation triggers, transparent reporting, and credible FX/fiscal policy signalling (IMF, 2024; World Bank, 2024; 2025; CBN, 2023). DLTH provides a policy-relevant lens linking leadership performance, institutional memory, and reform credibility in hostile democratic environments.